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ABSTRACT 
 
Throughout the contemporary period, the Church-State relationship in the nation-states of France, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal – which we will refer to as Latin Europe in this paper – has been a lively 
source of political conflict and societal cleavage, both on epistemological, and ontological 
grounds. Epistemological, in that the person living in Latin Europe has to decide whether his 
world view will be religious or secular; ontological, in that his mortality has kept some sense of 
the Catholic religion close to his heart and soul at the critical moments of his human reality. 
Secular views tend to define the European during ordinary periods of life, (“métro boulot dodo,”) 
while religious beliefs surge during the extraordinary times of life (birth, marriage, death,) as well 
as during the traditional ceremonial times (Christmas, Easter). This paper will approach the ques-
tion on the role of the Catholic church in contemporary Latin Europe by first proposing three 
models of church-state relations in the region and their historical development, then looking at the 
role of the Vatican, followed by an examination of some recent Eurobarometer data on the views 
of contemporary Catholics in each country, and finishing with an analysis of selected public pol-
icy issues in each country. Throughout, it is interested in the dual questions of whether religion 
still plays an important role in Latin Europe, and whether or not the Catholic church is still able to 
influence the direction of public policies in the now democratic nation-states of France, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal. 
                                                 
1To be presented at the Research Symposium “Of Crucifixes and Swords: The Catholic 
Church and the States in Comparative Perspective,” New Hampshire Institute of Politics 
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INTRODUCTION TO CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN LATIN EUROPE 
 
The nation-states of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal – which we will refer to as Latin 
Europe in this paper – share geographical, historical, political and religious space. They have, for 
over a thousand years, been connected to one another by a common Christian and Roman Catholic 
faith. Each has also been transformed by the modernizing and secularizing trends brought about 
by the democratic and industrial revolutions over at least the past two hundred years, usually 
traced to the 1789 French revolution. In the twentieth century, to varying degrees, each has ex-
perienced democracy and fascism, fought together as allies and against each other as enemies, 
been isolated from one another for long periods of time, and have recently come together as part-
ners in the European Union. Throughout the contemporary period, the Church-State relationship 
in each of these historically Roman Catholic nation-states has been a lively source of political 
conflict and societal cleavage.  
 
  There are frequently complex contradictions and complications when it comes to religion 
and politics in Latin Europe. Grace Davie, in her important work Religion in Europe: A Memory Mu-
tates, points out how the funeral Mass of former French President François Mitterrand illuminates 
this polemical relationship. In this case, Mitterrand, a proud heir of the anticlerical socialist and re-
publican tradition in France, noted in his last will and testament that “une messe est possible” – that 
is, a Mass could be celebrated – at his funeral.
2 As if this were not sufficiently stunning, the situation 
got even more complicated. Two funeral masses were celebrated for Mitterrand: the Bishop of Paris, 
Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger, celebrated a state funeral at Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris, and later 
that same day, a small mass for family members was celebrated in his hometown church of Saint-
Pierre de Jarnac. Miterrand’s wife, Danielle, attended both masses with their two sons. Also seated 
with the family was Mitterrand’s mistress, Anne Pingeot, and the twenty-one-year-old daughter, Ma-
zarine Pingeot, she had out of wedlock with him. Neither supporters nor opponents of Mitterrand 
were pleased: the anticlerical left was horrified to have their fallen leader in the hands of the clergy, 
feeling that Mitterrand had sold them out in death; the clerical right was disgusted that the Church 
would grant such privileges to a man who, although baptized Catholic, had lived a non-Christian life. 
In their view, even in death, Mitterrand managed to mock their faith when his mistress and their ille-
gitimate daughter appeared at Mass alongside of his wife and other children.   
 
For our present purposes, this story about a Catholic funeral mass for an agnostic president 
may just reveal something fundamental about French culture. That is, in death, Mitterrand admitted 
something about himself and about France that he denied in his political life: that his baptism contin-
ued to carry some significance for him, and that the Catholic Church has a role, perhaps an important 
one, to play in French society. All of this is quite reminiscent of the character of Jean Monneron, 
created by the French Catholic author Paul Bourget in his 1902 novel, L’Etape. In this novel, Mon-
neron converted to Roman Catholicism after a secular upbringing by republican, anticlerical parents, 
explaining, “I’ve decided to become what my family was for centuries. I want to get back, back to 
the depths of France. I can’t live without my dead.”
3 In this regard, and as also evidenced by the fu-
neral Mass for François Mitterrand, the need to be among one’s dead may represent a sort of “last 
stand” for Catholicism in France, and perhaps throughout the region, a point we will return to later 
on. 
 
                                                 
2Mitterrand passed this written request to his doctor, Jean-Pierre Tarot, on Sunday 7 January 1996, the eve of 
his death.  
3Paul Bourget, L’Etape (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1902), quoted in Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of 
the European Mind in the 19
th Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 114.  3
Suffice it to say for the time being that the issue of religion and politics in this region is 
complex, both on epistemological and ontological grounds: epistemological, in that the person 
living in Latin Europe has to decide whether his worldview will be religious or secular; ontologi-
cal, in that his mortality has kept some sense of the Catholic religion close to his heart and soul at 
the critical moments of his human reality. Secular views tend to define the European during ordi-
nary periods of life (“métro boulot dodo”), while religious beliefs surge during the extraordinary 
times of life (birth, marriage, death,) as well as during the traditional ceremonial times (Christ-
mas, Easter). 
 
This divide may well summarize the contemporary Catholic approach to religion in Latin 
Europe, and it appears to be what recent surveys of Catholics indicate. That is, even though the 
Catholics of contemporary Latin Europe continue to participate in the same sacraments, flock to the 
same pilgrimage sites, venerate the same saints, and look to the Holy See for spiritual guidance as 
traditionally practiced, there are also some significant differences from the past: present-day Catho-
lics fulfill their religious obligations less and less frequently, resulting in empty churches; their chil-
dren have not been opting for a religious life, creating a major crisis of vocations; and they have 
failed to properly support their churches financially, prompting some financial problems for certain 
dioceses.  
 
This paper will approach the question of the role of the Catholic church in contemporary 
Latin Europe by first proposing three models of church-state relations in the region and their his-
torical development, then looking at the role of the Vatican, followed by an examination of some 
recent Eurobarometer data on the views of contemporary Catholics in each country, and finishing 
with an analysis of selected public-policy issues in each country. Throughout, this paper is inter-
ested in the dual questions of whether religion still plays an important role in Latin Europe, and 
whether or not the Catholic church is still able to influence the direction of public policies in the 
now democratic nation-states of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
 
COMPETING MODELS OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS  
 
  Historically, the church-state relationship in Latin Europe has been rather fluid. To try to 
get a fix on the general trends, we could say that, grosso modo, there have been at least three 
overlapping models of church-state relations in these countries: the authoritarian  model, the 
secular, anticlerical model, and the strategic actor model. While the genealogy of each model 
can be traced to a particular historical moment or period, the intellectual space each occupies is 
not bound by time. Further, there is a time lag in each country. That is, whereas each country has 
experienced these various models, they rarely experienced them at the same historical moment. 
The fact that all four countries currently operate under similar economic and political arrange-
ments is a historical oddity, not the norm. In many ways these three distinct models are at once 
overlapping, contradictory and divisive. They also neatly sum up the historical evolution of the 
church-state relationship in Latin Europe. Let us now briefly look at each model. 
 
  First, there is the authoritarian model. The archetypal Catholic authoritarian model of 
political authority and legitimacy — known as the doctrine of the divine right of kings – held 
sway in Latin Europe until the democratic revolutions of the modern era. That authoritarian doc-
trine was successfully used by many monarchs, perhaps none better than the French Sun King, 
Louis XIV, to centralize power and authority in Paris. Another monarch associated with the au-
thoritarian, hierarchical, intolerant form of political Catholicism  is Spain’s King Philip.
4  The 
                                                 
4Renaissance Iberia was home to many centers of humanistic learning for members of the Church hierar-
chy. Universities in Coimbra, Salamanca, and Alcalá de Henares, offered courses in humanism, law, philo-
sophy, astronomy, as well as theology; the effort was to include Renaissance humanism in the training of  4
Roman Catholic Church legitimized the monarch’s claim to divine authority, and, in turn, typi-
cally received special privileges. The relationship between them was generally stable and jointly 
advantageous.  
 
 Second,  and  in opposition to the authoritarian model, the secular, anticlerical model 
emerged after the French Revolution of 1789. This model sought to limit, or even remove, eccle-
siastical authorities from the political equation. The unification of Italy and the loss of Papal terri-
tories in 1860 became a great source of political intrigue and turmoil for the Vatican and the new 
secular democratic regime in Rome. The pope at that time, Pius IX, argued that the liberal democ-
ratic revolutions, which promised free elections and free markets throughout Europe, represented 
a danger both to society and the Church. In response, he penned a document called the Syllabus of 
Errors in 1864, which strongly denounced the materialism and individualism of both liberalism 
and republicanism. The Syllabus suggests that these modern philosophies were inimical to Bibli-
cal truth.
5 Pius IX convened the First Vatican Council in 1870 to address the modern challenges. 
The Council developed a new doctrine of papal infallibility, placing the papacy at the center of 
Catholic opposition to modernity. Thomas Bokekenkotter noted in A Concise History of the 
Catholic Church that the results of the First Vatican Council led to the creation of a distinct 
antisecular Catholic culture.
6 Indeed, the Vatican did fight against the democratic and liberal 
revolutions of the modern era, and defended traditional authority relations in Latin Europe.
7 
Robert Putnam observes that in Italy, “For more than thirty years the Papal non expedit forbade 
all Catholics from taking part in national political life”
8 For their part, more and more republicans 
began to believe that the Catholic Church needed to be removed from politics, society, and educa-
tion, among other areas, if the promise of the democratic and liberal revolutions were ever to be 
realized.
9 Education became a main public-policy battleground precisely because it represented a 
chance for the State, or the Church, to influence the next generation with thoughts of revolution 
or reaction.
10 
 
 Third,  the  strategic actor, or interest group model, which emerged most notably of the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century in France and Italy, and after the democratic transitions of the 1970s 
in Spain and Portugal, appeared to turn the tables on the First Vatican Council’s approach to politics. 
That is, whereas Vatican I led to the growth of anticlerical attitudes among many elite groups in 
Latin Europe, especially in France, this new model provided a means for both the institutional 
Catholic Church and practicing Catholics to participate in democratic society. For instance, in the 
late 1940s during the Fourth French Republic, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire, founded by 
                                                                                                                                                 
priests. Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 39. See also, Lu Ann Homza, Religious Authority in the Spanish Re-
naissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2000). These universities provided the means for the great po-
litical theorists, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, Domingo de Soto and Luis de Molina, to argue 
against the injustices of the New World Conquest and to craft natural-law arguments in favor of civil re-
bellion. Alongside these early modern applications of natural law, the sixteenth-century was also a time of 
spiritual development. Ignacio de Loyola, San Juan de la Cruz and Santa Teresa de Jesús (also known as 
Teresa de Ávila) articulated spiritual practices that brought a believer into a personal relationship with God. 
Catholicism on the Iberian Peninsula was both formal and experiential, both hierarchical and personal. That 
all three of these mystical thinkers spent time in ecclesiastical prisons before achieving sainthood points to 
the breadth of Iberian Catholicism; the Church included inquisitors, saints, and the people who canonized 
them.  
5See Chadwick, 1975. 
6Bokenkotter, Thomas. A Concise History of the Catholic Church (New York: Doubleday Image Books 
1990). 
7See Conway, 1997. 
8Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy, p. 107. 
9See Gildea, 1994 
10See Gipson, 1989.   5
Catholics, combined Catholic social teachings with the secular welfare state.
11 In Italy, the Catho-
lic position found a home in the Christian Democratic Party from the late 1940s until the various 
political scandals of 1992.
12 No such close affiliation with political parties has existed in Portugal 
or Spain in the contemporary period, but the Church has found support among right-wing, tradi-
tional and conservative parties. Although Catholic values and worldview arguably still maintain 
some hold on the imagination, identity and behavior of this population, an allegiance to church no 
longer translates into a reliable, faithful, traditional voting block.
13 As a result, Church leadership has 
had to come up with other solutions to remain a player in public-policy debates. The declarations and 
documents of the Second Vatican Council, most notably Gaudium et Spes, were important catalysts 
in this new approach to politics.
14 
 
 Carolyn  Warner,  in  Confessions of an Interest Group, suggests that the post-1945 institu-
tional Catholic Church behaves as a “strategic actor,” or an interest group, in the public square. That 
is, it has attempted to influence public policies in Latin Europe by leveraging both its moral authority 
and its great numbers of followers — as potential voters — to secure health and welfare benefits, to 
stop liberalizations of divorce, abortion, the death penalty and, more recently, homosexual marriage, 
among other policy priorities. 
 
  These three models – authoritarian, anticlerical, and strategic actor – point to the varying 
degrees of influence the Church has had on Latin Europe’s governments: from the close ties of 
the Holy Roman Empire, when monarchs such as Philip II depended on the Church for legiti-
macy, to the hostilities of the eighteenth-century republics, when governments found legitimacy 
at the expense of the Church, to the strategic maneuvers required when the Church found itself as 
just one of several competing interest groups. These three models, however, fail to explain why a 
socialist President, who had built his career within an anticlerical tradition, allowed his funeral to 
be celebrated with a Mass, or why Spain responded to the railroad bombings in Madrid by cele-
brating Mass, the first state funeral held since Franco died. To understand those phenomena, we 
must open the discussion to include the Church’s influence on the framing of moral questions as 
well as its capacity to give meaning to life and death. 
 
  Therefore, as we consider whether the Church is losing its influence in Latin Europe, we 
will also look at the role religion plays in contemporary society, from both an epistemological and 
ontological perspective. The polling data offered by the Eurobarometer point to people’s prefer-
ences on public policy, their epistemological choices. The ontological aspect, however, is gener-
ally not garnered in opinion polls but in the Church’s teachings on what it is to be an animated 
member of society. Before we consider the formal structures of church-state relations, and the 
polling data on the Church’s influence on society, let us understand how the Church defined what 
it meant to be part of an evolving Catholic society.  
 
THE VATICAN’S CHANGING SOCIAL POLICY 
 
                                                 
11William Safran, The French Polity, p. 84. 
12Spotts and Wieser, Italy A Difficult Democracy, p. 9 
13Latin Europe has produced the only three women doctors of the Church (Saint Thérèse de Lisieux, Saint 
Teresa of Avila, Saint Catherine of Sienna), and the national holidays celebrated in these countries include 
Catholic Holy days. National holidays in Latin Europe include Epiphany (January 6), Holy Thursday and 
Good Friday, Assumption (August 15), All Saints’ Day (November 1), Immaculate Conception (December 8), 
and Christmas (December 25); 
14See Austin Flannery, O.P., ed., Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations (Northport NY: 
Costello Publishing Company, 1996), 163-282. Gaudium et Spes, “The Pastoral Constitution on the Church 
in the Modern World,” was issued on 7 December 1965.  6
From the teachings of Leo XIII, who emphasized a personal piety in line with the corpor-
atist hierarchy, to John XXIII, who emphasized a personal authority that demanded state account-
ability, the Church shifted from an institution that looked back longingly on the absolutist model, 
which was a time of guilds and Catholic kings, to the contemporary strategic actor model, featur-
ing a Church willing to engage in a critical dialogue with the modern world. 
 
The basis of Catholic political and social teaching can be found in Thomas Aquinas’s De 
Regimine Principum and the Summa Theologica.
15 According to the “Angelic Doctor,” the per-
fect society is analogous to a human body. Members of society, performing different functions, 
do not compete with one another but work together for the common good under the guidance of a 
single controlling authority, likened to the head. “For Aquinas,” explains Michael Bauer, “the 
common good does not refer to an aggregate of otherwise unrelated individual goods; rather the 
common good refers to the perfection or actuality of a community of individuals who themselves 
reach their perfection or actuality in and through the community that they collectively consti-
tute.”
16 The term for this arrangement, corporatism, takes on different tones depending on wheth-
er the single controlling authority is understood to be a dictator or a representative of the general 
will. Stanley Payne suggests that the original Catholic theories “emphasized societal corporatism 
from the bottom up, avoiding the centralized control of a powerful state.”
17 Payne distinguished 
societal corporatism from statist corporatism, which he sees as a twentieth-century invention in 
which bargains are negotiated from the top and imposed on the masses below. In all fairness, 
Aquinas’s works could support both a top-down and a bottom-up arrangement, particularly given 
the primacy of the human body metaphor, a metaphor that St. Paul in his first Letter to the Cor-
inthians speaks of in terms of equality and harmony.
18 What matters in this third “ism” is that all 
members of the body politic are assumed to share a common goal. Marx’s emphasis on class con-
sciousness has no place in this arrangement, as that would disrupt the natural and organic whole. 
Nor does political liberalism make much sense since it assumes that individual members need 
protection from the state. Within a corporatist framework the individual only exists inasmuch as 
he or she belongs to and participates in the state.
19  
 
The Vatican officially endorsed corporatism as a virtuous political system in the 1931 en-
cyclical, Quadragesimo anno.
20 The “fortieth year” Pius XI marked was the anniversary of an 
earlier encyclical, Rerum Novarum, in which Pope Leo XIII, drawing on Aquinas’s teachings, de-
livered the Vatican’s position on capital and labor in an industrialized world. Rerum Novarum ad-
dressed the needs of laborers by asserting the natural right of private property and the need for 
state-supported moral and religious education as provided by the Church. He condemned the so-
cialists for playing on men’s envy, creating class conflict and abolishing the natural right to hold 
property.  
 
It is important to stress that Leo XIII did not downplay the suffering of working people. 
He was well aware of “the misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the 
working class,” a condition he attributed to the absence of medieval guilds, but he had a far dif-
ferent solution than that proposed by Karl Marx.
21 In good corporatist fashion, he recommended 
                                                 
15See Thomas Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, edited by Paul E. Sigmund (New York: 
Norton, 1988). 
16Michael Bauer, “Natural Law and the Legislation of Virtue: Historicity, Positivity, and Circularity,” Vera 
Lex, New Series 2 (Winter 2001): 51-70, 54. 
17Payne, Spanish Catholicism, p. 162. 
18See I Corinthians 12:12. 
19Wiarda and Mott, Catholic Roots, p. 94. 
20Payne, Spanish Catholicism, p. 161. 
21Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (1891), para. 3. Available at the Vatican website: www.vatican.va.  7
workingmen’s unions, “private societies” which promoted Christian values and which worked 
with the state for the good of the whole. It should be noted that Leo XIII was unequivocal in giv-
ing states absolute authority in determining what was the good of the whole. For instance, unions 
that threatened the health of the state, such as Marx’s revolutionary proletariat, must be banned. 
In Rerum Novarum, we see a Church fearful of socialism and in league with anti-democratic 
regimes as long as they promoted Catholic values. The single controlling authority, then, not the 
various members of the whole, was in charge of directing the state. 
 
 Leo XIII also took this opportunity to emphasize the primacy of the family over the 
needs of the State. “The socialists,” writes Leo XIII, “in setting aside the parent and setting up a 
State supervision, act against natural justice, and destroy the structure of the home.”
22 A more 
“natural” arrangement, one in keeping with Catholic social teaching, is to give the wage earner 
better working conditions and a just wage, thus allowing mothers and children to stay at home. As 
far as Leo XIII is concerned all social problems can be resolved through personal piety, private 
property and corporatist politics. 
 
If Leo XIII’s encyclical on social justice shored up corporatist regimes, that legitimacy 
was beginning to erode by the early 1960s. With the unholy union of economic liberalism and 
political fascism, it became clear that promoting family values and protecting private property 
were not enough to insure justice for the working class. Natural-law arguments against socialist 
regimes did not address the sins of capitalist greed: the exploitation of workers and the vast dis-
parities between rich and poor people and between first- and third-world nations. When John 
XXIII revisited Rerum Novarum in his 1961 encyclical on Christianity and Social Progress, 
Mater et Magistra, he reaffirmed the rights of workers to a just wage and to hold private property, 
recognizing, however, the right to “all classes of citizens.”
23 Rather than focus on the failings of 
socialism, John XXIII focused his concern on the inequitable structures of capitalism. First-world 
nations, who consumed the earth’s resources at the expense of the developing world, were in 
danger of committing structural sins. 
 
It would be easy to polarize the teachings of the pre-Vatican II Church, as represented by 
Rerum Novarum, and the teachings of John XXIII. So much has been written on the differences in 
social doctrine before and after John XXIII’s papacy that it would be easy to conclude that the 
pope who convened the Second Vatican Council had made a radical break from the past. In fact, 
John XXIII cites much of Rerum Novarum in his encyclical, describing the earlier work as a “de-
fense of the earthly interests of the poor.”
24 For instance, both Leo XIII and John XXIII used Je-
sus’s teachings on caring for the poor to censure the superfluous wants of the wealthy.  
 
A key difference between the two encyclicals, however, is that Mater et Magistra empha-
sizes experiential authority while Rerum Novarum looks to hierarchical authority for moral an-
swers. When writing about labor groups, John XXIII encourages them to “treat their individual 
members as human persons and encourage them to take an active part in the ordering of their 
lives.”
25 In the section on “Theory and Practice,” he argues that formal instruction in Catholic so-
cial thought “must be supplemented by the students’ active co-operation in their own training.”
26 
Simply obeying the hierarchy is no longer enough. The students must “gain an experimental 
knowledge of the subject, and that by their own positive action.”
27 The members of the body poli-
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26Ibid., para. 231. 
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tic must be reanimated. Seventy years after Rerum Novarum appointed the state as the watchdog 
of social groups, the members of the body politic had regained their authority through positive ac-
tion. 
Along with other documents from the Second Vatican Council, Mater et Magistra estab-
lished the Catholic Church not just as a defender of the poor but as a promoter of democratic par-
ticipation from the bottom up. For liberal Catholics in Italy and in France, as well as for the aver-
age Spanish and Portuguese worker struggling to survive in the difficult conditions under the 
Franco and Salazar regimes, the Pope’s words were a godsend. For the two Iberian dictators, both 
of whom were used to being in charge, the changes occurring at the Vatican were problematic, to 
say the least.  
 
THE DICTATORS AND THE CHURCH 
 
One frequently associates the authoritarian Catholic model of authority relations in the 
twentieth century with the Iberian dictators. This is a reasonable association, given the longevity 
of these regimes. However, it is also important to point out that this model also had resonance in 
Italy and in France during that period. D.A. Binchy’s Church and State in Fascist Italy demon-
strates how some supporters of Mussolini were convinced “that a synthesis between Fascist and 
Christian doctrine can be achieved.”
28 These Catholics were clearly reacting, at least in part, to 
the secular and anticlerical regime which was the First Italian Republic. For his part, Benito Mus-
solini negotiated an important Concordat with Pope Pius XI in 1929, the so-called Lateran Pact, 
which undid the anticlerical legislation of the First Italian Republic, established Catholicism as 
Italy’s state religion, and arrived at a financial settlement over the Papal States taken during Ital-
ian reunification.
29 There were certainly areas of disagreement and tension between the Pope and 
the dictator, but they did manage to co-exist more than had been the case with the Church and the 
Italian First Republic. One can only wonder how long this absolutist model would have continued 
had Mussolini survived the Second World War in the same way that Franco and Salazar did.  
 
As for France, a similar belief existed among some conservatives that the Catholic 
Church could get a better deal from Henri-Philippe Pétain’s government than had been the case 
under the anticlerical and secular Third Republic – and certainly after the Popular Front swept to 
power in the 1936 elections. This was an extreme situation, to say the least. The German authori-
ties invited Pétain, the eighty-three-year-old French hero from the First World War, to lead the 
Vichy government. From almost a perverse sense of nationalism, he agreed, so that some of 
France could remain under French control. Of course, the Vichy government was established just 
as an administrative convenience for the Germans, and France remained occupied. And yet, some 
conservatives found reason for hope with this new government, as Robert O. Paxton observes: 
 
Most Catholics longed for official support for religious values and for undoing 
old wrongs that still smarted: the “expulsion of God” from public schools in the 
1880’s, the quarrel over church property at the time of the separation of church 
and state in 1905, laws that discriminated against religious orders. The new 
Catho lic left, while it horrified traditional Catholics by its denunciations of capi-
talism and the laissez-faire state, was if anything more hostile to the secular re-
public than the others. And so Monseigneur Delay was speaking for most Catho-
lics when he told Pétain at the end of 1940 during one of the marshal’s triumphal 
tours, “God is at work through you, Monsieur le maréchal, to save France.”
30 
                                                 
28D. A. Binchy, Italian Fascism and the Church, p. viii. 
29Spotts and Wieser, Italy A Difficult Democracy, p. 242. 
30Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: Columbia Univer-
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Under Pétain, the traditional republican slogan of the French revolution of “liberté, egalité and 
fraternité” was reworked to “travail, famille, and patrie” – work, family and fatherland. This re-
vised fascist slogan was considered to be more in keeping with traditional values. So, even in 
France, with its long democratic history, one can find a longing for the authoritarian model well 
into the twentieth century. The eventual defeat of fascism in the Second World War returned 
France to its democratic trajectory, but this absolutist interlude remains noteworthy. 
 
It was in Iberia where the authoritarian model was most rooted in the twentieth century. 
Salazar and Franco were in common agreement that Rerum Novarum was a useful tool. Both 
Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and Francisco Franco made use of the authority granted by Rerum 
Novarum, banning any interest groups or associations they felt were contrary to the good of the 
whole. Labor and management were grouped together by type of industry, not by class allegiance. 
Private property was protected and traditional family values promoted. Any change that occurred 
was orchestrated by the elites and imposed in a top-down fashion. Particularly in the early years 
of the dictatorships, those who disagreed were persecuted and either exiled or executed.  
 
Of the two, Salazar was closer to the principles of Catholic teaching. Howard Wiarda 
writes that Salazar had been “a seminarian, trained for the priesthood, and active in Catholic so-
cial movements; he was thoroughly imbued with the Catholic-corporatist conception.”
31 Franco, 
on the other hand, was a career military man. He was also a pragmatist. Rather than consult 
Church doctrine to resolve political problems, Franco was engaged in keeping powerful interests 
in check, the Church being only one of them. Another interest was the Falange, which was far 
more interested in repressing Marxist or liberal elements than in promoting Christian social jus-
tice. Interestingly enough, even though the Church was a competing interest in Spain, from the 
look of formal documents, it was the only game in town. The concordat signed with the Vatican 
in 1953 began with the following decree: “The Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion, being the 
only religion of the Spanish nation, enjoys rights and prerogatives which are its due conforming 
to Divine and Canon Law.”
32 The concordat granted the state the right to intervene in the altera-
tion of ecclesiastical jurisdictions, particularly the right to appoint bishops, a right that became in-
creasingly problematic as the Church sided more with the concerns of laborers and against the re-
pressive policies of the regime.
33 In exchange, the Church, recognized as a “perfect society” and a 
juridical personality, received tax exemptions and government subsidies for salaries and the 
maintenance of cathedrals, parishes, religious orders, and other ecclesiastical institutions. Besides 
the financial benefits, the Church controlled family matters: all marriages had to be celebrated by 
a priest, divorce, contraception and abortion were prohibited, and Catholic religious education 
was obligatory. The Church held the right to censure all educational material while its own publi-
cations were free from state censorship.
34  
 
  By contrast, the Portuguese 1940 Concordat used far less insistent language. The appoint-
ment of bishops was subject to “objections of a general political nature,” and priests were subject 
to military service, admittedly as chaplains. The state subsidized parochial schools “if they were 
located in missionary areas” and Catholic religious education was required of all students, unless 
parents requested an exemption. Public education followed Christian principles, which were un-
derstood as “traditional principles.” Divorce was banned unless the parties were not Catholic, a 
condition that created a two-tiered society, where those who remained wedded remained Catholic 
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and those who divorced became non-Catholic.
35 The moderate and flexible terms of this Concor-
dat may explain why it is the only one still in existence in Europe.
36  
 
The 1933 constitution, something that Franco never bothered with, proclaimed Portugal 
to be both a republican and corporative state. Of the two houses of parliament, one was based on 
geographical representation and the other on functional representation. The Catholic Church, 
along with other corporatist interests such as the military and the wine industry, was guaranteed a 
certain number of seats.
37 Yet under the terms of the Constitution, the Church was not formally 
recognized. Even though Salazar used Quadragesimo anno as a blueprint for his government, the 
official status of the Church was less visible than in Spain. For instance, in Article 45 Portuguese 
confessionality is represented as follows: 
 
The State, recognizing its responsibilities before God and man, assures freedom of 
worship and organization to those religious bodies whose doctrines are not con-
trary to the fundamental principles of the existing constitutional order, nor offend 
the social order or good morals, and whose worship respects the life, physical in-
tegrity and dignity of the person. 
 
Anyone apprised of the situation would immediately realize that the only religious body “whose 
doctrines are not contrary to the fundamental principles of the existing constitutional order” is the 
Roman Catholic Church. But Salazar, perhaps recognizing that republican virtues were tied to 
American foreign aid, and cognizant of the persistent anticlerical feelings in Portugal’s southern 
region, did not give the Church official status. Rather, in the following article (46), the Church is 
recognized for its role in Portuguese culture. 
 
The Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion is considered to be the traditional religion 
of the Portuguese nation. The Catholic Church possesses existence as a legal 
body. The principle regulating relations between the state and religious bodies is 
that of separation, without prejudice to the existence of concordats or agreements 
with the Holy See.
38 
 
Through careful rhetoric, Salazar was able to promote freedom of religion and constitutional rec-
ognition for the Church – to be, as he claimed, both republican and corporatist. 
 
  After Vatican II, the Spanish Church became more alienated from the regime. Younger 
priests, who were more familiar with the poverty of the working class than Republican persecu-
tions, took up the demands of urban pastors. Ecclesiastical base communities started appearing in 
poor and working-class neighborhoods in Madrid and other large cities.
39 As early as 1960, 
younger clergy, particularly in the Basque region, protested the close ties between the hierarchy 
and the Franco regime.
40 Eventually, the younger generation found some sympathy in Cardinal 
Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, known as “Paul VI’s man,” who became the Archbishop of Madrid-
Alcalá in 1971, much to Franco’s dismay.
41 Tarancón was eager to bring Spain more in line with 
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39Brassloff, Religion and Politics, pp. 69-70; Payne, Spanish Catholicism, p. 201. 
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Vatican II teachings and to prepare his flock for life after Franco. He was, in Stanley Payne’s 
words, the “optimal” leader during the transition to democracy.
42 
 
  Opus Dei provides an entirely different face for Spanish Catholicism than these left-
leaning priests. Founded in 1928 by Josemaría Esquivá de Balaguer during the civil strife pre-
ceding the Spanish Civil War, Opus Dei (God’s work) has developed into “the strongest pressure 
group within the Roman Curia, which runs the Catholic Church.”
43 Now an international organi-
zation with “chapters” in at least eighty-seven countries, Opus Dei is credited with being the en-
gine behind the Spanish economic miracle of the seventies and eighties, when economic growth 
rates were around 8 percent of GNP, and is reportedly one of the biggest players in the Euromar-
ket.
44 In its focus on economic capitalism, Opus Dei is not unlike the Falange, an ultra-Catholic 
(read repressive and intolerant) organization, more interested in economic efficiency than social 
justice. Unlike the Falange, the source of Opus Dei’s power is not the dictatorship but the current 
Pope, who granted Opus Dei the official title of “personal prelature” in 1979, and who canonized 
Esquivá in 2003. With its authoritarian hierarchy, Opus Dei puts a contemporary face on statist 
corporatism. 
 
Unfortunately, it is hard to know anything for sure about Opus Dei because it operates, 
for the most part, in total secrecy. It is believed that members of Opus Dei are involved in the 
center-right party, Partido Popular (PP), and that the former prime minister, José María Aznar, 
appointed many Opus Dei members to his cabinet and gave them key civil service positions.
45 If 
these assumptions are correct, the Roman Catholic Church, or at least its personal prelature, has 
enormous influence on the political life of Spain. Opus Dei’s influence on the social quality of 
Spanish Catholicism is not quite as apparent.  
 
THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CHURCH 
 
  As discussed earlier, by the 1960s the Vatican began to move away from an absolutist 
model, even though this system was still being used by Portugal and Spain.
46 The democratic 
transitions in Iberia in the 1970s were the means by which the absolutist model came to an abrupt 
end, and ushered in a new model of church-state relations. Under the new democracies, in princi-
ple at least, all religious organizations were granted equal rights in the eyes of the secular authori-
ties, although the Roman Catholic Church has managed to negotiate some special privileges. The 
constitutional provisions regarding religions in each country establish the official framework for 
this model, and based on its actual behavior over the past thirty years, the Church has abandoned 
an absolutist model and has moved to a strategic-actor approach throughout Latin Europe.  
 
Grace Davie suggests that, whereas Italy, Spain and Portugal remain solidly Catholic – at 
least in terms of their culture – France displays some unusual characteristics. In her words, “France is 
a hybrid case … it is culturally part of Catholic Europe but far more like the Protestant North in 
terms of its religious practice or patterns of belief. It is, moreover, the country of Western Europe 
which embodies the strictest form of separation of church and state.”
47 
 
  Indeed, the secular and anticlerical model has been institutionalized in France to such a de-
gree that it cannot even tolerate the idea of religion in public places. For instance, the French govern-
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ment has recently been battling the religious practices of Islamic women in the so-called “affaire du 
foulard.” The issue involves whether the wearing of Muslim headscarves and other religious sym-
bols at state-run schools violates the secular nature of state education. Parliamentary leaders have ex-
pressed their commitment to secularism and recently passed a measure banning the practice. The 
French Constitution of 1958 prohibits discrimination on the basis of faith, and incorporates a 
1905 law in France on the separation of religion and State. Combined, these legal provisions only 
authorize a religious organization as legal in the three areas of baptism, marriage and funeral. The 
2001 law on the “Prevention and Repression of Sect Movements,” know as the Picard law, ex-
tends the reach of government into the operations of religious groups, even granting it authority to 
dissolve sects if they are found to be in violation of law.
48 Although state education is completely 
secular in France, some 20 percent of French school children are enrolled in Catholic schools, 
around 40 percent in Brittany. Citizens reacted strongly against the Socialist attempt in the early 
1980s to cut state funding for Catholic schools. In the early 1990s, the state actually increased its 
support, including helping the Catholic schools with salaries for teachers. French parents tend to 
appreciate the educational value of Catholic schools, which perform an important societal func-
tion.
49 
 
 Unlike  the situation in France, the so-called “crucifix affair” in Italy had a surprising out-
come. In this case, a Muslim immigrant argued that Catholic symbols such as crucifixes had no 
place in officially secular state buildings, including schools and government buildings. Recently, 
a high court reversed a lower court ruling, and found that the crucifix is a “symbol of the 
country’s identity” and may remain. Just as France distances itself from its religious heritage, Italy 
has been trying to blend its Roman Catholic identity with its secular government.
50 So, whereas the 
Italian constitution recognizes the state of Vatican City to be an independent, sovereign entity, the 
1984 revision of the 1929 Concordat granted the Catholic Church certain privileges. The Pope 
himself, and the Italian Bishops’ Conference, both play important roles in articulating the 
Catholic vision in the public square, in particular after the collapse of the Christian Democratic 
Party in 1992.
51 
 
 O n its face, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 has also severed all ties between the state and 
the Church. Section 16, paragraph 3 declares, “No religion shall have a state character.” Still, the 
Roman Catholic Church is the only confession to achieve some amount of formal recognition. The 
following line states, “The public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish 
society and shall consequently maintain appropriate cooperation with the Catholic Church and other 
confessions.” One of the places where that “appropriate cooperation” is most visible is in the matter 
of education. Paragraph 3 of Section 27 guarantees the “right of parents to ensure that their children 
receive religious and moral instruction in accordance with their own convictions,” a guarantee posted 
on the walls of many a parish. Given the Church’s de facto responsibility with respect to the moral 
and religious education of Spanish students, a service the State continues to pay for, the collective 
memory of Christian symbols and rites is unlikely to disappear very soon. Unlike neighboring 
France, where a basic understanding of Christian teaching is “precarious,” students in Spain continue 
to recognize Christian references in art and music. While many Europeans are no longer able to 
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follow the story in European art and music, Spaniards continue to catch the references. And, despite 
constitutional claims to the contrary, democratic Spain continues to provide a de facto “church 
tax system.” In Portugal, private funding for the Church remains “generous.”
52 
 
  The Portuguese Constitution of 1976, which has been amended twice, provides for free-
dom of religion. The two most important documents relating to religious freedom are the 2001 
Religious Freedom Act and the 1940 Concordat. The former provides non-Catholic religions with 
the same benefits previously reserved for the Catholic Church;
53 on-going negotiations seek to 
revise the latter. Unlike the anticlerical and secular Lei de Separação in 1911, which essentially 
placed the Church under the control of the State, the civil authorities now seek to find a settlement 
with the Church authorities providing for both secular and clerical space in Portuguese society. 
 
In their totality, these constitutions invite the Catholic Church to participate in the public-
policy process, not as an official state member, but as an important religious organization in civil 
society. Secularization has changed the political and social landscape in Latin Europe, leading one to 
consider – following Grace Davie – to what extent religion remains at the center of the Latin Euro-
pean value system. For answers to that, let us now look at the contemporary Catholic makeup of 
these countries.  
 
THE CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN EUROPE  
 
In terms of gross numbers, the number of people in Latin Europe who are at least nominally Ro-
man Catholic is significant. As indicated in Table 1, of the approximately 228 million people 
living in Latin Europe, some 154 million are Roman Catholic.  
 
Table 1: Catholic Population of Latin Europe 
 
  Total Population  % Catholic  Catholic Population 
Italy  57,998,353 96 55,678,419 
France  60,180,529 83 49,949,839 
Spain  41,478,000 95 39,002,000 
Portugal  10,328,000 95     9,343,000 
 
Sources: http://www.catholichierarchy.org/country/sc1.htmlhttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
index.html; Our Sunday Visitor’s Catholic Almanac (2004) 
 
Table 2 breaks down the Catholic clergy population, and gives a sense of the problems faced 
throughout Latin Europe. Portugal, Spain and France are also on the verge of a vocation crisis; the 
French church has responded by increasing the numbers of laymen to the deaconate. 
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Table 2: Population of Clerics and Religious in Latin Europe 
     
 Dioce-
san 
Priests 
Reli-
gious 
Order 
Priests 
Permanent 
Deacons 
Religious 
Male 
Religious 
Female 
Parishes Priest 
to      
Parish 
Ratio 
Seminari-
ans 
Italy 33,684  17,611  2,594 23,051 106,498 25,823 1.99:1  6,205
France 18,179 4,910  1,684 8,639 45,102 19,835 1.16:1  1,428
Spain 17,580  8,925  203 15,028 58,663 22,679 1.14:1  2,732
Portugal 3,119  960  143 1,411 6,063 4,364 0.93:1  535
 
Sources: http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc1.html;  
Our Sunday Visitor’s Catholic Almanac (2004) 
 
One can clearly discern the problem of vocations by looking at the ratios for seminarians to 
priests (both from religious orders and diocesan). In France there is only 1 seminarian to 16.2 
priests; in Spain, 1 for every 9.7; in Italy, 1 for every 8.3, and 1 for every 7.6 priests in Portugal.
54 
Reacting to this situation, especially in France, Pope John Paul II suggested that “the crisis the 
Church is going through is in large part due to the repercussions of social changes, new forms of be-
havior, the loss of moral and religious values and a widespread consumeristic attitude,” adding that 
“growing de-Christianization is the major challenge at the moment.”
55 In this regard, Roger Price has 
observed that, in the case of France, 
 
The collapse of religious vocations in the 1950s and the resultant ageing and sharp 
decline in the number of priests are clear signs of a crisis and of an inability to com-
bat secularization, especially on such crucial moral questions as abortion and contra-
ception and this in spite of a less rigorist moral theology. A new Sunday, for a new 
society, and a mass culture emerged in the 1960s.
56 
 
Price’s point is well taken.
57 Certainly, by demographics alone, the center of Christendom has 
shifted from Europe and North America to the developing world. Philip Jenkins’s provocative re-
search outlines how few Europeans are still practicing their faith while Africans, Asians, and 
Latin Americans are steadily converting and reanimating their faiths.
58  
                                                 
54See  http://www.catholic-heirarchy.org/country/sc1.html and Our Sunday Visitor’s Catholic Almanac 
(2004) 
55Keesings Contemporary Archives , 24 January 2004.  
56Price, p. 301. 
57AD2000 Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 2001): 20. Father Gerard Lachivert, secretary-general of the Confer-
ence of Religious Major Superiors of France, spoke at a 1-4 December 2000 meeting of major superiors of 
French men’s and women’s religious orders and congregations. They met in Lourdes to address the chal-
lenge posed by the crisis in vocations and its consequences. Lachivert stated that, “In general, we can speak 
of the certain death of religious families that rose in the nineteenth century for educational, charitable and 
health purposes.” He also noted the birth of “new communities” in France since the 1970s, including 
Emmanuel, the Beatitudes, New Way (“Le Chemin Neuf”), Bread of Life (“Pain de Vie”) and others from 
the Charismatic Renewal. The new groups have become the principal seedbeds of vocations to the priest-
hood in France. Franciscans and Dominicans have also seen a resurgence of vocations. Also, in France, the 
vocation crisis has led to more Masses led by laity, and women frequently lead. This is allowed under the 
guidelines set forth by ADAP (“Assemblées Dominicales en l’Absence de Prêtre”). 
58Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). Of note, Jenkins points to the number of converts outside Europe as evidence of a shifting 
center of a New Christendom. Hervieu-Léger sees converts and pilgrims as “the two ideal types” through 
which we can understand the religious life of modern societies. Most of the recent Catholic converts are  15
 
Latin Europe is no exception to this trend. There are fewer men willing to sign on to a life 
of chastity and fewer still who are willing to live out their lives as priests. Given this shortage of 
clergy, Spanish and Portuguese parishes have had to recruit priests from Latin America. In terms 
of their immigrant status, these new recruits should have much in common with their parishion-
ers: Jenkins makes a strong case that the faithful in the New Europe will be the New Europeans, 
those who have recently arrived from the evangelized developing world.
59 And yet the numbers 
clearly indicate that religion is neither disappearing nor dying in Latin Europe. By mid-2025 the 
overall population is expected to drop to 9.3 million and the percent of baptized Roman Catholics 
to drop to almost 89 percent.
60 By these figures it is hard to support the Pope’s thesis that Latin 
Europe is experiencing a “dechristianization.”
61  
 
When asked if they considered themselves religious, a significant percentage of Catholics 
throughout Latin Europe answered affirmatively. Table 3 shows that the number varied widely, 
with Portugal and Italy on the more religious side, Spain and France less so. However, even in 
France, the single largest group of respondents considered themselves to be religious. 
 
Table 3: Are You Religious? 
 
  Religious  Not Religious Agnostic Atheist Don’t Know 
Portugal 89%  6%  1%  2%  2% 
Italy 82%  4%  8%  3% 3% 
Spain 66%  18%  7% 7%  3% 
France 46%  24%  5% 19%  7% 
 
Source: Eurobarometer, 1995 
 
The question of whether or not a person trusted the church revealed a significant cleavage among 
Catholics in Latin Europe. As displayed in Table 4, whereas respondents in Portugal and Italy 
indicate that they do trust the Church by a significant margin, respondents in Spain were almost 
evenly split, and a slim majority of the respondents in France stated that they do not trust the 
Vatican. 
 
Table 4: Do You Trust the Church? 
 
 Yes  No 
Portugal 75% 20%
Italy 58%  30% 
Spain 49% 45%
France 41% 46%
 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2001 
 
These results suggest that a more pressing concern for the social health of Catholicism would be 
the increasing privatization of religion, a phenomenon that some sociologists claim often follows 
modernization – especially when one compares the results in Table 3 and 4: the number of people 
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claiming to be religious does not automatically translate into trust in the institutional church.
62 
The numbers also indicate that practice of formal religion is down. In the case of France, for ex-
ample, William Safran has observed that 
 
Religious practice is relatively insignificant in selected regions around Paris and 
more noticeable in the rural areas of Brittany, Alsace, and Auvergne. But 
throughout the provinces there are many small communities from which the 
priest has departed and where churches are in a state of disrepair.
63 
 
Certainly, one could posit that secularization has influenced the behavior of French society more 
than the rest of Latin Europe, but its influence is felt throughout the region.  
 
When asked how often they attended Mass, and consistent with the results of Table 4, only 17 
percent of French Catholics stated that they attend Mass weekly, in contrast to 37 percent of 
Portuguese Catholics, 35 percent of Spanish Catholics, and 42 percent of Italian Catholics. These 
results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: How Often Do You Attend Services? 
 
 Several  times 
a week 
Once a Week A Few Times 
a Year 
Once a Year  Never 
Portugal 6%  31%  35%  21% 7% 
Spain 7%  28%  35%  18%  13% 
Italy 7%  35% 39%  11%  8% 
France  9%    8%  19%  26%  19.5% 
 
Sources: Eurobarometer, 1995; Information France from Group GSA TMO 21 April 2002
64 
 
The percentage of those attending church weekly has dropped significantly throughout Latin 
Europe, most significantly in France. It is too soon to know whether France is a bellweather coun-
try for the rest of Latin Europe or an exception, but the trend against the regular practice of one’s 
faith appears to be pervasive throughout. Take Italy, for example: whereas a 1956 study found 
that almost 70 percent of Catholics attended Mass regularly, Table 5 indicates that that number 
has dropped by over twenty-five percentage points in the last forty-six years.
65 Surveys also in-
dicate that the elderly, females, and people living in rural areas attend Mass more frequently that 
other population groups. And yet, despite of the fact that majorities of Catholics do not attend 
weekly services, and may not accept all aspects of Church teaching, many people still consider 
religion to be important, as indicated in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Is Religion Important? 
 
 Very 
Important
Rather 
Important
Not Very 
Important
Not At All 
Important 
Portugal 17.1  39.1  26.7  17.2 
Spain 24.1 31.3 27.3 17.3 
Italy 30.7  37.0  20.7  11.6 
France 13.9  28.8  27.9  29.4 
 
World Values Surveys, University of Michigan, 1981-1997 
 
Of note, the family continues its hold on the population of Latin Europe. Roger Price ob-
serves that, although religion has “declined to insignificance as a feature of daily life,”
66 … “fam-
ily loyalties remain of central importance” in France. The results of both Tables 7 and 8 confirm 
this insight in the French case and broaden it to all four countries.  
 
Table 7: More Emphasis on Family Life Is? 
 
 Good Bad Don’t  Mind
Portugal 95.3 1.9  2.9 
Italy 90.6  1.6  7.9 
France 89.8  1.4  8.8 
Spain 94.4  2.3  3.3 
 
Source: World Values Survey, 1981-1997 
 
The family has traditionally been that social unit where religion has always been cultivated and 
nurtured and, at the very least, Table 8 shows that a large percentage of Spanish, Italian and 
French claim to be satisfied with their family life. 
 
Table 8: Are You Satisfied With Your Family Life? 
 
 Satisfied Dissatisfied
Spain 87  3 
France 86 6 
Italy 82  18 
 
Sources: International Gallup Poll, 1996, Information from Italy comes from Pew Research Survey 2002 
 
The traditional family-based Catholic rites of baptism, marriage and last rites continue to be ad-
ministered and accepted by majorities of the Catholic population in Latin Europe. These are per-
formed at higher rates in Italy, Spain and Portugal than in France.
67 Grace Davie notes baptisms 
in France for children at 58 percent, down from 92 percent in 1958; there is an increase in adult 
baptism (there were 11,000 adult baptisms in 1996), a new phenomenon. Current statistics on the 
number of people being baptized in the Church in Iberia are still very high. The World Christian 
Encyclopedia reports that the number of professing Catholics in Spain, based on baptisms, is 96.1 
percent of the total population (over 39 million) in mid-2000, with a drop to 94.7 percent ex-
pected by mid-2025 (when the population is expected to drop to under 37 million).
68 In Portugal, 
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which in mid-2000 had a population of 9.8 million, the percentage of the population baptized 
Roman Catholic was almost 91 percent. Davie notes that over 80 percent of marriages in Spain, 
Italy and Portugal are performed according to Catholic rite, but only 55 percent in France.
69 These 
figures may suggest that the hold of Roman Catholicism remains located the Latin European 
family unit.  
 
In spite of some of their religious views, the French are not necessarily that much more 
progressive than the rest of Latin Europe. In a revealing study, 83 percent of respondents in 
France thought that the mother, not the father, ought to care for children, compared to 80 percent 
of Spanish respondents. This traditional view of the family may indicate that the French just may 
have more in common with the rest of Latin Europe they would like to admit. 
 
Table 9: Which Parent Should Take Care of the Children? 
 
 Mother Father Doesn’t  Matter Don’t  know 
France 83  4  13  1 
Spain 80  1  19  0 
 
Source: International Gallup Poll, March 1996 
 
Finally, Table 10 offers a view of how Latin Europeans view religions other than Roman Catholi-
cism. The status of Jews in Latin Europe is an ongoing concern, and there is a real fear that the 
Jewish population may completely disappear from the region. Grace Davie reports that combined, 
the rate of Jewish deaths and emigrations to Israel greatly outnumber new Jewish births. Jews 
marrying people from other religious traditions are increasingly common. Combined, these pat-
terns endanger the Jewish future in Latin Europe.
70 For their part, the rate of Muslims entering 
Latin Europe is increasing at a rapid pace. They also face a hostile environment, and, as indicated 
in Table 10, an important question is whether the larger population will tolerate them. 
 
Table 10: Are You Disturbed by the Presence of People of Another Religion? 
 
 No  Yes  Don’t  Know
France 78% 17% 5% 
Italy 84% 12% 4% 
Portugal 89% 10% 1% 
Spain 92% 6%  2% 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 1995, 2000 
 
These results are fascinating: in France, where religion is not considered very important by 56 
percent of the population, 17 percent consider an alien religious tradition disturbing. In the three 
other countries, this number is significantly less. Perhaps the perceived Muslim threat, and the 
question of headscarves in public schools, is responsible for these results.  
 
In their totality, the results from the ten tables suggest that we should not assume that the 
Roman Catholic Church will necessarily become marginalized in Latin Europe. Families remain 
strong, religion remains important, and Catholic rituals continue to be practiced. However, secu-
lar pressures are clearly altering the face of Catholicism in Latin Europe. To be sure, under the 
dictators, the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed enormous privilege, legal, political, and moral. Yet 
                                                 
69Grace Davie, Religion and Society, p. 74. 
70 Davie, pp. 18-19  19
the Church’s effectiveness at creating a truly confessional society even with these privileges is in 
doubt. In 1973, the Catholic journal Vida Nueva reported that, according to a survey, the majority of 
Spaniards lived their religion as something “peripheral, conventional, formal and with no great depth 
of conviction and corresponding commitment.” By 1975, sociologists were claiming that Spain was 
experiencing a “phase of dechristianisation.” Later Pope John Paul II would refer to this phenomenon 
as “Spanish neopaganism.”  
 
Terms such as “dechristianization” and “neopaganism” are a bit misleading in that they sug-
gest an evolutionary process. In all fairness, Catholicism in Latin Europe was never particularly 
deep, at least not in a formal sense. The faithful of Portugal, most of whom live in northern rural 
areas, have been more interested in making a pilgrimage to the Virgin of Fátima or in worshipping a 
local saint than in following pronouncements issued in Rome, let alone the archdiocese of Lisbon. 
One can identify similar patterns in Lourdes, France. Ruth Harris argues in Lourdes: Body and Spirit 
in a Secular Age, that the devotion to the Blessed Mother really had more to do with the religiosity of 
a small rural community within a secularizing France at the midpoint of the nineteenth century than 
with the institutional church. Or, in her words, “Lourdes in the early decades is a story about France, 
about the struggles of Catholicism in the aftermath of revolutionary turmoil.”
71 In Spain and in Italy, 
where local saints still get far more attention than formal doctrine, Spaniards and Italians have 
historically used the Church for baptisms and weddings, but their experience of the faith has been 
more local than doctrinal. Perhaps it is not surprising that when the Iberian dictatorships gave way to 
democracies, regular church attendance fell off substantially. Can we really claim that Latin Europe 
is truly becoming dechristianized? 
 
In our view, a better case could be made that Latin Europeans are privatizing their reli-
gious life by “cherry-picking” through the Church’s social teachings. For instance, a 1994 survey 
conducted by the International Social Survey Program on “The Family and Changing Gender 
Roles II” reports that almost half of all Spaniards interviewed believed that abortion was not a 
bad thing.
72 In Portugal, allowing non-Catholics to divorce created a two-tiered society, where 
people left the faith, particularly in Lisbon and other large cities, in order to pursue personal 
goals. This brings us to the question of contemporary public policy in Latin Europe. 
 
SELECTED PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE CATHOLIC CHRUCH 
 
An aptly named article “A flock that strayed,” appearing in the 6 January 1996 edition of 
the Economist, observed that: 
 
As befits a people who have the Vatican in their midst, nine out of ten Italians 
call themselves Catholic. Nearly 100% are baptized, and almost as many pass out 
of this world according to the rites of the Catholic church. Scratch below the reli-
gious surface, however, and things look very different. In Italy, the pope’s writ 
does not run far. So reveals a survey backed by the Italian bishops’ conference 
and carried out by sociologists at Milan's Catholic University.
73 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, the institutional Catholic Church has had to compete as 
an interest group, or a strategic actor, with other groups in each country of Latin Europe over a 
variety of public policy issues. In some cases, the institutional church has fought for policies 
against the wishes of a majority of its own membership, causing a serious lay-clerical cleavage 
within the church itself. We will limit our observations to just three issues: abortion, capital pun-
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73The Economist, “A Flock That Strayed,” Vol. 338, Issue 7947 (6 January 1996).  20
ishment, and homosexual marriage. Combined, these serve as a representative sample of the pub-
lic policy challenges currently faced by this church-as-an-interest group. 
 
  First, let us look at abortion. Considering life as God’s greatest gift, the Catholic Church has 
termed abortion to be a grave sin. This teaching has only some resonance with the population of Italy 
and Spain, and less so with the French, as indicated in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Abortion Should Be Allowed in the Early Months of a Pregnancy 
If the Woman Wants It 
 
 Completely 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Completely 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
France 52%  23%  11%  10%  4% 
Italy 30%  23%  15% 25%  7% 
Spain 35%  17%  14%  26%  8% 
 
Source: Times Mirror, 1991 
 
Seventy-five percent of the respondents in France support a pro-choice position, compared to 53 
percent of Italians and 52 percent of the Spanish. As for the Portuguese, a 1998 referendum on 
the legalization of abortion was defeated by a 50 percent to 48 percent margin, with almost 70 
percent of the voting public abstaining. The very fact that such a large percentage of voters chose 
not to voice their opinion on the matter speaks volumes to a deep-seated confusion as to the right 
path to take. 
 
In Spain and Portugal, the two countries that do not allow abortion on demand, the pro-
cedure can take place if the heath of the mother is in jeopardy. In 1998 the Spanish parliament re-
jected a bill which would have permitted the termination of any pregnancy in the first twelve 
weeks if it created a personal, social or family conflict for the woman – a bill condemned by the 
Catholic Church. Portugal and Spain both distribute the so-called French abortion pill RU486 pill 
through their national health systems. 
 
Chart 1: Abortion Policy in Latin Europe, 2003 
COUNTRY GOVERNMENTAL  POLICY 
France  The 1975 Veil Act legalized first-trimester abortion on request is legal. An unmar-
ried minor needs parental consent or a judges approval in order to obtain a legal 
abortion. 
Italy  Since 1978 first-trimester abortion is legal on social grounds and free-of-charge. In 
2001 Silvio Berlusconi's proposed amending the law to include subsidies and fam-
ily therapy to try to persuade women to avoid having abortions. 
Portugal  Abortion on request is illegal. First-trimester abortion may be obtained in extreme 
cases, including rape, incest or if the life of the mother is in danger. Medical per-
sonnel are not required to perform the procedure if they conscientiously object to 
abortion. 
Spain  Abortion on request is illegal. Spanish law allows abortion through the first 12 
weeks of pregnancies in cases of rape, incest, fetal malformation or if the preg-
nancy is judged by a doctor to be dangerous to the mother's life or mental health.  
 
Sources:www.prolifeinfo.org/pol5.html;http://www.ecrealty.info/aborto/aborto-1.htm; www.pregnancy.mb. 
ca/quote-4.htm; http://ippfnet.ippf.org/pub/IPPF_Regions/IPPF_ CountryProfile.asp? ISOCode=ES, 
http://www.iri europe.org/europewatch/europewatch2000-1.html 
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  During the papacy of John Paul II, the Catholic church has condemned a creeping “cul-
ture of death,” which, in his view, devalues humanity. Although his views on abortion get a lot of 
press attention, John Paul has also condemned the death penalty. All of the countries of Latin 
Europe have banned this penalty, three of them taking the step during John Paul’s papacy. This is 
not to suggest that the governments adopted this policy because of the Pope’s strong stance, but it 
was arguably a contributing factor. 
 
Chart 2. Death Penalty in Latin Europe 
 
COUNTRY  LEGAL STATUS  SINCE WHEN  MOST RECENT EXECUTION 
France Illegal  1981  1977 
Italy Illegal  1994  1947 
Portugal Illegal  1976  1847 
Spain Illegal 1995  1975 
 
Source: http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-abolitionist1-eng 
 
In recent years, the question of same-sex marriage has come up in Latin Europe. For its 
part, the Vatican has asked Catholic politicians throughout the world to fight legislation allowing 
gay marriages.
74 The issue of same-sex marriage certainly challenges the traditional organization 
of Latin European society and has not yet found many supporters. There is significant resistance 
to the idea, even in France. For instance, during the last presidential campaign in France, the con-
servative Gaullist party candidate Jacques Chirac observed, “I think that every child needs a 
mother and a father – female references and male references – to construct his identity.” Socialist 
Lionel Jospin agreed with Chirac’s assessment, and, as such, same-sex marriage was not a cleav-
age issue in the French electorate’s decision to re-elect Chirac.
75 In fact, and as indicated in Chart 
3, none of these countries allow for same-sex marriage, but each is dealing with the question of 
civil unions.  
 
Chart 3: Legal Status of Same-Sex Couples in Latin Europe 
 
France  Same-sex couples may not marry. They may register their partnership under the 
1999 social union law, know as PACS (Pacte Civil de Solidarité). The government is 
considering an anti-bias law would write homosexual protections into an existing 
law that outlaws slurs based on race and nationality. 
Italy  Same-sex couples may not marry. They may register as domestic partners in Pisa 
and Florence. This is not recognized elsewhere and is not legal marriage 
Portugal  Same-sex couples may not marry. Legislation passed in 2001 grants same sex cou-
ples who have lived together for more than two years the same rights as heterosex-
ual couples in common-law marriages.  
Spain  Same-sex couples may not marry in Spain’s Navarra and Basque regions; same-sex 
couples who live together for a long period may also receive the same benefits as 
heterosexuals under common-law unions.  
 
Sources: http://www.ilga.org/Information/Legal_survey/Europe/supporting%20files/ supreme_ court_ 
deems_same.htm; http://www.datalounge.com/datalounge/news/regions.html?region=1489 
 
In 1999, the French parliament passed legislation allowing homosexual couples to register their 
partnerships with the civil authorities, known as PACS, or the “Pacte Civil de Solidarité,” and to 
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benefit from some of the rights of heterosexual married couples. In Portugal, 2001 legislation 
passed grants same sex couples who have lived together for more than two years essentially the 
same rights as heterosexual couples in common-law marriages. The incoming socialist Spanish 
government has promised to take up this issue in the next year. 
 
There is no clear pattern among the three important public policy issues. Whereas the 
Vatican has, on balance, been on the losing side on abortion decisions, the opposite is true regard-
ing capital punishment. The question on same-sex marriage is still open, but the Vatican seems to 
have the upper hand, at least for the time being. Ronald Inglehart’s findings in Modernization and 
Postmodernization may provide some insight. He identifies a distinct geographical and religious 
space in Europe, which he calls “Catholic Europe,” including Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. “Catholic Europe” differs from “Protestant Europe” on the basis of so-called “survival 
values.” Inglehart found that Catholics showed preferences for law and order, strong political 
leaders, jobs and economic growth, a hierarchical religious structure, and a social structure predi-
cated on a two-parent heterosexual family unit. This finding suggests that a Latin Europe may 
exist, at least in terms of these shared values.
76 Perhaps these shared values hold the key to under-
standing public-policy decisions in Latin Europe. To the degree that an issue is based on Catholic 
values, then the Vatican may maintain a strategic advantage over competing interest groups in 
that policy area.  
 
CONCLUSION: THE CHURCH A STRATEGIC MORAL ACTOR 
 
As we have seen, the church-state relationship in Latin Europe is fluid. On the question 
of the three models (authoritarian, secular-anticlerical, and strategic actor), the strategic actor 
model certainly contains explanatory value in how the Church attempts to influence public policy. 
The Vatican often acts like an interest group, rallying support and negotiating deals. On the other 
hand, the Vatican certainly did not push for Mitterrand’s funeral Mass, a private decision on his 
part that indicated a sense of the Catholic religion close to his heart and soul at the critical mo-
ments of his human reality. The recent state funeral in Madrid after the March 2004 terrorist at-
tacks is another example of a European society responding to a national tragedy first by voting in 
the socialists and then by genuflecting.  
 
All three models provide some insight into the church-state relationship. The authoritar-
ian model has been losing salience, whereas the other two maintain supporters. Given that all four 
countries are currently liberal, democratic regimes, the strategic actor model – Carolyn Warner’s 
useful analysis comes to mind – may hold the most explanatory value in the contemporary period. 
To the degree that Warner’s argument involves the ontological aspect of the Church’s strategy (that 
is, not as a political actor who hopes to gain influence and effect specific public policy but as a moral 
actor who changes the terms of the political debate by opening it up to a larger question of being), it 
makes a great deal of sense to us to apply the strategic actor term to the Vatican II documents. How-
ever, if one were to apply the strategic actor label to the Church purely in terms of interest group be-
havior (a strictly positivist analysis), then we would suggest the analysis would be lacking in funda-
mental ways. We propose that the Church has behaved more exactly as a “strategic moral actor” in 
the years since the Second Vatican Council, in that it has both sought political influence and has 
also offered important moral criticism of existing systems, not to mention its capacity to make 
sense of extraordinary events in one’s life. 
 
The new democracies and the on-going effects of secularization have posed a variety of 
challenges for the Catholic Church. The faithful are less likely to automatically obey the Vatican, 
and there are fewer and fewer priests. At the same time, and as Owen Chadwick argues in The 
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Secularization of the European Mind in the 19th Century, the epistemological state of human fra-
gility and mortality leaves a space for religion, and the Catholic Church, for many people. The 
triumph of secularization notwithstanding, religion serves to comfort and provide answers to the 
unknown. Even François Mitterrand turned to Rome at the end of his life. 
 
There is not enough evidence to accept the proposition that Latin Europe is being de-
christianized. To the contrary, there is ample evidence of the vibrancy of Catholicism there. 
France, for example, long known as the “eldest daughter of the church,” and having gained a 
twentieth-century reputation for being one of the most secular and hostile nations to the church, is 
showing some signs that it could be the Church’s prodigal son in the next century.
77 In this regard, 
Sophie Sahakian-Marcellin and Franck Fregosi have argued that Catholicism in France, in spite 
of appearances to the contrary, is not disappearing, but rather is presently evolving into a new 
form.
78 Similarly, William Safran notes that 
 
In many respects, France ... manages to be a thoroughly Catholic country. The 
town cathedral remains in subtle ways a focal point for French culture. Most pub-
lic holidays are Catholic holidays, and public institutions are shut down. There is 
still little commerce on Sundays, and the major newspapers do not appear on that 
day … Catholic celebrations tend to be more cultural-familial than theological, 
and religion in general more personal than institutional.
79  
 
These words apply throughout the region, and underline the vibrancy and strength of the Roman 
Catholic Church and faith in Latin Europe. One of the more interesting issues facing Europe now is 
whether its Christian heritage will be mentioned in the new European Constitution. The Spanish, 
Portuguese and Italian governments have all supported the Pope’s call to include some reference 
to Europe’s Christian heritage in the new Constitution of the European Union. French President 
Chirac has also stated that he agrees with the Pope on this matter. If they present a united front, 
the four countries of Latin Europe could help get this language inserted into the final text.  
 
  Sociologists of religion suggest that we take a broader look at how religion functions in 
society, not just, say, as a promoter of Christian values or social corporatism, but as a collective 
memory. In Vers un Nouveau Christianisme, Danièle Hervieu-Léger argues that, although mod-
ern societies tend to corrode traditional practices, including religion, a condition she calls amne-
sia, they also require solutions to existing problems that oftentimes only religion can solve, what 
she refers to as a need for utopia.
80 Grace Davie describes Hervieu-Léger’s conclusions as “the 
paradox of Modernity, which in its historical forms removes the need for and sense of religion 
(the amnesia), but in its utopian forms cannot but stay in touch with the religious (the need for a 
religious future).”
81 Roman Catholicism, then, is not just the hierarchy or the formal liturgy; it is 
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the cave in Provence where she lived. The Baptism of Clovis in Rheims on Christmas Day 496 by Bishop 
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and Saint Thérèse of Lisieux. 
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also Latin Europe’s collective memory, a place to go when looking for answers to current 
problems.  
 
  The Eurobarometer data presented earlier clearly support this last point. They demon-
strate that secular practices control the quotidian epistemological experience of the average Latin 
European, and that religious practices dominate their periodic, ontological moments. As such, we 
conclude this paper by suggesting that it is indeed in the realm of possibility that these 155 mil-
lion Roman Catholics in Latin Europe share a “collective memory” of their church and their faith. 
In the end, the fictional character of Jean Monneron may very well encapsulate this collective 
memory. His cry, “I can’t live without my dead,” brings us to the ontological notion that the 
shared memories of Catholics in Latin Europe will continue to influence their societal behavior, 
political activities and their beliefs in God. 
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